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Abstract	Explanations	 in	 psychiatry	 often	 integrate	 various	 factors	 relevant	 to	psychopathology.	 Identifying	 genuine	 causes	 among	 them	 is	 theoretically	 and	clinically	important,	but	epistemically	challenging.	Woodward’s	interventionism	appears	 to	 provide	 a	 promising	 tool	 to	 achieve	 this.	 However,	 it	 cannot	 be	applied	to	psychiatry.	 I	 thus	 introduce	difference-making	interventionism	(DMI),	which	 detects	 relevance	 in	 general	 rather	 than	 causation.	 DMI	 mirrors	 the	empirical	 reality	 of	 psychiatry	 even	 more	 closely	 than	 interventionism,	 but	 it	needs	to	be	supplied	with	additional	heuristics	to	disambiguate	between	causes	and	 other	 difference-makers.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 I	 suggest	 employing	 heuristics	based	on	multiple	experiments,	temporal	order	and	scientific	domain.						
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1.	Causal	Explanations	in	Psychiatry	Causal	 explanations	 are	 abundant	 in	 psychiatry.	 Common	 statements	 include,	e.g.,	 that	 traumatic	 life	 events	 cause	 depressions,	 that	 excess	 dopamine	 causes	mania,	 that	 fear	 causes	 patients’	 heart	 rates	 to	 accelerate,	 and	 that	 a	 spiders	crawling	 on	 an	 arachnophobic’s	 arm	 caused	 her	 panic	 attack.	 Philosophers	traditionally	 struggle	with	 such	 causal	 claims	 linking	processes	 in	 the	 physical	domain	(dopamine	levels,	heart	rate,	a	spider’s	crawling	on	skin)	to	those	in	the	realm	 of	 the	 mental	 (trauma,	 depression,	 fear,	 panic	 attack).	 But	 despite	convincing	 theoretical	 arguments	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	mental	 is	 causally	 pre-empted	 by	 the	 physical	 (e.g.	 Kim	 1998),	 talk	 of	 causation	 is	 pervasive	 in	 the	empirical	reality	of	psychiatry.		 One	 may	 suspect,	 of	 course,	 that	 causal	 explanations	 in	 psychiatry	 are	merely	 an	 instance	 of	 “sloppy	 talk”.	 But	 while	 in	 everyday	 clinical	 practice	psychiatrists	might	sometimes	use	“cause”	as	shorthand	for	“difference-maker”,	psychiatry	as	a	scientific	discipline	cannot	afford	to	blur	the	distinction	between	genuine	causes	and	other	difference-makers	(background	conditions,	parts	of	a	whole,	 realizers,	 etc.).	 Building	models	 of	 psychiatric	 diseases,	 disambiguating	between	 alternative	 explanations,	 and	 selecting	 treatment	 options	 all	 may	require	 understanding	what	 genuine	 causes	 of	 a	 given	 condition	 are.	 Memory	loss	after	a	car	crash,	for	instance,	may	result	from	posttraumatic	stress	disorder	(PTSD)	or	gas	poisoning	that	occurred	during	the	accident.	Clearly,	the	treatment	will	 differ	 depending	 on	 whether	 poisoning	 or	 trauma	 caused	 memory	 loss.	Distinguishing	 causes	 from	 other	 difference-makers	 in	 explanations	 of	 mental	illness	 thus	 is	 not	merely	 a	 philosophical	 apprentice	 piece	 but	highly	 clinically	relevant.		 With	 his	 manipulability-based	 interventionism,	 Woodward	 (2003)	proposed	an	account	of	causation	and	causal	explanation	that	aligns	nicely	with	experimental	 research	 practice.	 As	 such,	 it	 seems	 a	 promising	 candidate	 to	overcome	(philosophical)	worries	of	causal	exclusion	and	evaluate	causal	claims	in	psychiatry	(Kendler	and	Campbell	2009,	p.	886).	However,	interventionism	is	not	up	to	the	task:	it	is	designed	to	assess	causal	relations	only	in	contexts	where	no	other	dependence	relations	are	present.	But	psychiatrists’	causal	claims	often	relate	 mental	 (memory	 loss,	 depression)	 and	 physical	 (car	 crash,	
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neurotransmitters)	 domains,	 which—problematically	 for	 the	 interventionist—are	usually	 considered	 to	 stand	 in	non-causal	dependence	 relations.	No	matter	whether	 we	 characterize	 cognitive	 processes	 as	 based	 on,	 grounded	 in,	
implemented,	 realized,	 constituted,	 or	 underlain	 by,	 or	 supervening	 on	neurophysiological	process	 in	 the	brain:	 as	 soon	as	non-causal	 relations	 are	 at	issue,	interventionism	cannot	be	applied.		 This	 problem	 is	 a	 principled	 one;	 it	 shows	 up	 in	many	 special	 sciences	exhibiting	a	certain	inter-	or	multi-level	character.	Many	modern	special	sciences	combine	 insights	 gained	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 investigation,	 from	 different	scientific	 domains.	 The	 same	 principled	 questions	 we	 are	 dealing	 with	 when	relating	 psychology	 and	 neuroscience	 in	 psychiatric	 explanations	 also	 arise	when	 linking	 factors	 from,	 say,	 astronomy,	 and	physics,	molecular	 biology	 and	population	genetics,	or	anthropology	and	meteorology.	But	for	the	time	being	let	us	focus	on	psychiatry.	The	current	paper	offers	a	systematic	account	of	how	to	identify	causes	in	psychiatry	despite	the	presence	of	non-causal	dependence	relations.1	I	suggest	a	weakened	 version	 of	 interventionism,	difference-making	 interventionism	 (DMI),	that	 allows	 applying	 interventionist	methodology	despite	 the	 presence	 of	 non-causal	 dependence	 relations.	 DMI	 acknowledges	 that	 observed	 manipulability	underdetermines	the	underlying	dependence	relation.	But	this	loss	in	specificity	is	 a	 virtue	 rather	 than	a	vice:	 	 Psychiatrists	often	employ	 interventions	 (e.g.	 in	randomized	control	 trials)	before	 they	know	what	kind	of	 relation	grounds	 the	relevance	of	difference-makers.	 Likewise,	 recent	 attempts	 to	model	psychiatric	disorders	 by	means	 of	 networks	 (e.g.	 Borsboom	 2017)	 incorporate	 a	 range	 of	different	 factors	 (physiological,	 genetic,	 environmental,	 behavioral),	 regardless	of	 the	 possible	 dependence	 relations	 between	 them.	 DMI	 captures	 and	accommodates	 for	 this.	 Besides,	 it	 highlights	 that	 thinking	 about	 explanatory	relevance	 in	 terms	of	causal	relevance	only	 is	 too	narrow.	Still,	embracing	DMI	does	neither	mean	causal	 relevance	 loses	 its	 special	 status,	nor	 that	we	cannot	disambiguate	between	different	kinds	of	dependence	relations	in	principle.		
																																																								1	This	is	not	a	paper	on	the	metaphysics	or	semantics	of	causation.	I	am	here	primarily	concerned	with	the	epistemic	question	of	how	to	identify	causal	relations	in	cases	where	other	dependence	relations	are	present	as	well,	particularly	in	psychiatry.	
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Disambiguation	 between	 causal	 and	 non-causal	 dependencies	 might	 be	achieved,	I	suggest,	by	drawing	on	resources	other	than	interventions:	We	may	not	 only	 combine	 evidence	 from	 many	 experiments	 to	 infer	 systematic	dependencies	 but	 can	 also	 supplement	 difference-making	 graphs	 with	 the	
dimensions	of	time	and	domain.	A	third	dimension	may	accommodate	for	multiple	
realizers.	 Thus	 equipped,	 DMI	 preserves	 the	 manipulationist	 core	 of	interventionism	 while	 relying	 on	 additional	 heuristics	 helps	 identify	 causes	among	difference-makers.		Section	2	introduces	Woodward’s	interventionism	and	the	problems	with	applying	 it	 to	psychiatry.	 Section	3	 introduces	DMI	 along	with	 some	heuristics	that	may	help	us	identify	genuine	causes.	Section	4	concludes.		
2.	Woodward’s	Interventionism	and	its	Application	in	Psychiatry	According	 to	 Woodward’s	 (2003,	 2008)	 interventionist	 account	 of	 causation,	causal	relations	can	be	detected	by	difference-making:	causes	make	differences	to	 their	 effects.	 Causal	 explanations	 thus	 embody	 a	 “what-if-things-had-been-different	conception	of	explanation”	(Woodward	2003,	p.	228).	That	is,	they	tell	us	 what	 will	 (or	 would)	 happen	 under	 a	 range	 of	 different	 circumstances.	Inspired	 by	 work	 on	 causal	 modeling	 (Spirtes	 et	 al.	 1993,	 Pearl	 2000),	Woodward	 translates	 questions	 about	 causal	 relations	 into	 questions	 about	relations	between	variables	(representing	properties	or	events)	taking	different	values.	Causal	relations	between	variables	can	be	represented	in	directed	acyclic	
graphs.	On	the	interventionist	account,	we	can	infer	that	X	causes	Y	if	and	only	if	we	 can	 carry	 out	 an	 intervention	 on	 X	with	 respect	 to	 Y.	 A	manipulation	 of	 X	qualifies	 as	 an	 intervention	 I	 on	 X	with	 respect	 to	 Y	 if	 and	 only	 if	 I	 meets	 the	following	conditions:	(i)	I	causes	X,	(ii)	I	overrides	all	other	causes	of	X,	(iii)	any	directed	path	 from	 I	 to	Y	 goes	 through	X	 (i.e.	 there	must	not	be	 a	 causal	path,	neither	direct	nor	through	other	variables,	from	I	to	Y	that	does	not	go	through	X),	and	(iv)	I	is	statistically	independent	of	any	variable	Z	that	causes	Y	and	that	is	on	a	directed	path	that	does	not	go	through	X.	That	is	to	say,	an	intervention	I	
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“breaks	 off”	 all	 other	 influences	 on	 X	 and	 manipulates	 X	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	changes	in	Y	are	only	mediated	through	changes	in	C	and	not	in	any	other	way.	2	Interventionism	 thus	 defined	 mirrors	 the	 manipulative	 character	 of	experimental	 research	 practice	 and	 reflects	 certain	 well-known	 principles	 of	experimental	design	(e.g.	randomized	control	trials).	It	thus	allows	us	to	directly	
infer	 causal	 relations	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 observed	manipulability	 in	well-designed	empirical	studies.	Prima	 facie	 then,	assuming	adequate	experimental	standards	apply	 in	 psychiatry,	 we	 might	 think	 that	 the	 interventionist	 view	 “provides	 a	single,	 clear	 empirical	 framework	 for	 the	 evaluation	 of	 all	 causal	 claims	 in	psychiatry”	(Kendler	and	Campbell	2009,	p.	886;	see	also	Campbell	2007,	2016,	Rescorla	2017).	Consider	 the	 following	 toy	 examples:	 Tom	was	mentally	 healthy	 before	his	 father	 died.	 But	 as	 part	 of	 his	 bereavement	 reaction	 Tom	 started	 grieving.	While	initial	grief	after	bereavement	is	not	a	mental	illness,	Tom’s	bereavement	experience	 was	 so	 severe	 and	 long-lasting	 that	 it	 developed	 into	 full-blown	depression,	although	nothing	else	had	changed	about	his	life.3	Given	this	picture,	it	makes	sense	for	the	psychiatrist	to	infer	that	Tom’s	grief	(more	precisely,	his	bereavement	 experience	 characterized	 by	 severe	 grief)	 caused	 his	 depression.	Similarly,	 if	Gina’s	heart	rate	was	at	69bpm	while	she	was	relaxing	on	 the	sofa	before	it	suddenly	accelerated	to	132bpm	as	she	was	afraid	there	was	a	burglar	in	 the	hallway	 (while	nothing	else	changed)	 it	makes	sense	 to	 infer	 that	Gina’s	fear	of	a	burglar	caused	her	heart	rate	to	accelerate.	And	so	on.	We	can	picture	this	with	the	graphs	are	shown	in	figure	1.		
																																																								2	Woodward	captures	this	 in	his	definitions	(M)	and	(IV).	While	(M)	expresses	that	causation	is	grounded	in	manipulability	relations,	(IV)	explicates	the	conditions	under	which	a	manipulation	is	an	appropriate	intervention,	i.e.	suitable	to	uncover	causal	relations.	For	the	full	definitions	see	Woodward	(2003)	p.	59	and	p.	98,	respectively.	3	The	precise	relations	between	bereavement	experiences	(including	grief,	apathy,	guilt,	etc.)	and	depression	 are	more	 complex	 than	 the	 current	 example	 suggests	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Pies	 2014,	Wagner	2014	 for	 discussions	 about	 dropping	 the	 bereavement	 exclusion	 in	 DSM	 V).	 For	 current	purposes,	however,	the	simplified	scenario	of	Tom	developing	a	depression	some	time	after	his	bereavement	experience,	which	was	primarily	characterized	by	severe	grief,	will	do.	For	brevity,	I	shall	talk	about	Tom’s	grief.	
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	Figure	 1:	 Two	 independent	 causal	 graphs	 illustrating	 Gina’s	 and	 Tom’s	cases.	 Setting	 the	 value	 of	 G	 (representing	 Tom’s	 grief)	 from	 0	 to	 1	changes	 the	 value	 of	 D	 (representing	 his	 depressive	 state)	 from	 0	 to	 1.	Setting	the	value	of	F	(representing	Gina’s	 fear)	 from	0	to	1	changes	the	value	 of	 H	 (representing	 her	 heart	 rate)	 from	 69	 to	 132bpm.	 The	interventions	 (I)	 are	 the	 death	 of	 Tom’s	 father	 and	 Gina’s	 hearing	footsteps	in	the	hallway.		 This	reasoning	squares	well	with	clinical	evidence	to	the	effect	that	grief	can	cause	depressive	episodes	(e.g.	Beck	and	Alford	2009)	and	that	mental	states	such	as	fear	affect	an	individual’s	heart	rate	(e.g.	Cuthbert	et.	al.	2003).	Likewise,	there	 is	 evidence	 for	 manipulations	 in	 the	 mental	 domain,	 like	 cognitive	behavioral	therapy	(CBT),	to	be	efficacious	in	treating	conditions	such	as	anxiety	and	depression	(e.g.	Sofronoff,	Attwood,	and	Hinton	2005,	Butler	et	al.	2006).	But	should	 this	 lead	 to	 us	 conclude	 that	 interventionism	 allows	 us	 to	 establish	notoriously	 difficult	 mental-to-mental4	(in	 Tom’s	 case)	 as	 well	 as	 mental-to-physical	(in	Gina’s	case)	causal	claims?	No.	The	cases	are	not	as	unproblematic	for	the	interventionist	as	they	might	seem.		To	 ensure	 we	 can	 sort	 actual	 causes	 from	 confounding	 factors	 and	accidental	correlates,	 interventionist	analyses	require	that	all	of	the	considered	variables	 in	a	causal	graph	must	 in	principle	be	 independently	manipulable	 (see	Woodward	2008,	p.	209,	Woodward	2015).	For	if	this	were	not	the	case,	we	will	run	 risk	 of	 violating	 (iii)	 and	 (iv).	 Thus,	 if	 we	 assume	 there	 is	 some	 sort	 of	systematic	 (implementation,	 realization,	 supervenience,	 grounding,	…)	 relation	between	mental	and	physical	phenomena,	applying	interventionism	is—despite	its	 intuitive	 plausibility—simply	 not	 licensed	 (Eronen	 2012,	 Raatikainen	 2010,	Shapiro	2010,	Shapiro	&	Sober	2007,	Kästner	2017).	Recently,	a	number	of	attempts	have	been	made	to	save	interventionism	for	scenarios	with	non-causal	relations	(for	discussions	in	the	context	of	mental	causation	see,	e.g.,	Woodward	2008,	2015,	Baumgartner	2010,	2013,	Gebharter																																																									4	For	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 example	 suppose	 Tom’s	 depression	 (at	 least	 his	 depressive	 mood)	 is	 a	mental	phenomenon.		
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2015,	Hoffmann-Kolss	2014,	Kästner	2017;	an	analogous	debate	in	the	context	of	constitutive	 mechanistic	 explanations	 is	 reviewed	 in	 Kästner	 and	 Andersen	2018).	 The	 proposed	 modifications	 typically	 advocate	 either	 splitting	 causal	graphs	 or	 introducing	 exception-clauses	 for	 non-causal	 dependence	 relations.	But	even	if	these	strategies	were	successful,	neither	is	convincing	in	the	case	of	psychiatry.	 First,	 psychiatrists	 typically	 aim	 at	 integrated	 explanations	 relating	different	 (mental,	neurophysiological,	 genetic,	…)	 factors.	These	 factors	may	be	relevant	 for	 different	 reasons:	 because	 they	 exert	 a	 causal	 influence,	 because	they	 are	 a	 part	 of	 the	 implementational	 (realization,	 supervenience)	 base	 of	 a	certain	 psychopathology,	 because	 they	 are	 background	 conditions,	 etc.	Interventionism,	by	contrast,	 is	designed	to	assess	causal	relations	only.	Second,	the	 exact	 relations	 between	 different	 variables	 often	 remain	 subject	 to	investigation	 and	 cannot	 be	 presupposed	 before	 scientists	 start	 testing	 for	manipulability.	Current	 network	 models	 of	 mental	 disorders	 (e.g.	 Borsboom	 2017,	Borsboom,	 Cramer	 &	 Kalis	 forthcoming)	 illustrate	 this.	 These	 models	 are	typically	 based	 on	 interventionist	 reasoning.	 However,	 they	 usually	 include	concrete	symptoms	along	with	behavioral,	cognitive,	genetic,	demographic,	and	environmental	 factors	as	variables.	While	 some	of	 these	may	 in	 fact	be	 related	causally	 (e.g.	 grief	 causing	 depressive	 mood),	 for	 others	 that	 seems	 at	 least	questionable.	 Is	 Tom’s	 low	 serotonin,	 for	 instance,	 implementing	 or	 causing	depression?5	And	does	 his	 socio-economic	 situation	 causally	 contribute	 or	 is	 it	merely	 a	 background	 condition?	 Despite	 such	 questions,	 network	 models	 are	powerful	 tools	 to	 figure	 out	 which	 factors	 are	 relevant	 to	 mental	 disorders.	Applying	 interventionist	 reasoning	 to	 them	 helps	 uncover	 which	 factors	influence	 one	 another,	 as	 well	 as	 what	 the	 developmental	 dynamics	 are.	Moreover,	 the	 manipulationist	 strategy	 matches	 well	 with	 empirical	 research	reality	 and	 provides	 our	 best	 currently	 available	 account	 of	 scientific	 (causal)	explanation.	 Thus,	 it	 seems	 well	 worth	 trying	 to	 save	 interventionism	 for	psychiatry.																																																											5	Talking	about	“low	serotonin”	as	the	substrate	of	depression	is	probably	too	simplistic;	you	might	consider	it	a	placeholder	for	whatever	the	neurophysiological	substrate	of	depression	according	to	your	favorite	account.	
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3.	Difference-Making	Interventionism	for	Psychiatry	To	save	interventionist	reasoning	for	psychiatry,	I	introduce	a	weakened	form	of	interventionism:	 difference-making	 interventionism	 (DMI).	 Rather	 than	 limiting	our	 analysis	 to	 causal	 relations,	 DMI	 identifies	 a	 whole	 bundle	 of	 difference-making	relations	(among	them,	of	course,	causal	relations).	Thus,	we	can	apply	DMI	in	cases	where	non-causal	dependence	relations	are	present.	To	balance	the	resulting	 loss	 in	 specificity,	we	can	employ	additional	heuristics	allowing	us	 to	identify	genuine	causes.			
3.1	The	Bare	Bones	of	DMI	To	 uncover	 dependence	 relations	 with	 DMI,	 we	 can	 keep	 using	 variables	 and	directed	 graphs	 (now	 speaking	 of	 difference-making	 rather	 than	 causal	 paths)	and	 proceed	 by	 the	 familiar	 interventionist	 method:	 DMI	 takes	 X	 to	 be	 a	difference-maker	for	Y	with	respect	to	a	given	variable	set	V	if	and	only	if	there	is	a	possible	(IVdm)-defined	intervention	on	X	with	respect	to	Y	that	will	change	Y	when	all	other	variables	Zi	 in	V	are	held	 fixed,	except	 for	 those	on	a	difference-
making	 path	 from	 X	 to	 Y.	 (IVdm)	 defines	 an	 intervention	 as	 follows:	 A	manipulation	I	of	X	qualifies	as	an	intervention	on	X	with	respect	to	Y	if	and	only	if	it	meets	the	following	conditions:	(i)	I	is	a	difference-maker	for	X,	(ii)	I	overrides	all	other	difference-makers	influencing	X,	(iii)	any	directed	path	from	I	to	Y	goes	through	 X	 (i.e.	 there	must	 not	 be	 a	 difference-making	 path,	 neither	 direct	 nor	through	 other	 variables,	 from	 I	 to	 Y	 that	 does	 not	 go	 through	 X),	 and	 (iv)	 I	 is	statistically	independent	of	any	variable	Zi	in	V	making	a	difference	to	Y	and	that	is	on	a	directed	path	that	does	not	go	through	X.6			 The	 advantages	 of	 DMI	 are	 that	 we	 no	 longer	 need	 to	 worry	 about	restricting	our	variable	set	 to	 independently	manipulable	variables	or	knowing	among	 which	 variables	 non-causal	 dependencies	 obtain	 before	 we	 proceed	 to	test	 for	 manipulability.	 This	 is	 empirically	 realistic	 as	 it	 reflects	 that	 (a)	conceiving	of	explanatory	relevance	as	causal	relevance	only	 is	 too	narrow	and	(b)	 psychiatrists	 often	 employ	 interventionist	 reasoning	 (e.g.	 in	 randomized																																																									6	This	is	structurally	analogous	to	Woodward’s	definitions	(M)	and	(IV),	just	modified	to	no	longer	restrict	our	analysis	to	causal	relations	(cf.	section	2).	
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control	 trials)	 before	 they	 know	 what	 kind	 of	 relation	 grounds	 the	 observed	difference-making	relation.	The	clinical	efficacy	of	antidepressants,	for	instance,	underdetermines	why	these	drugs	work.	Do	they	work	because	 they	target	 the	cause	of	disease	or	because	they	interfere	with	the	pharmacological	mechanism	implementing	 certain	 pathologies?	 Likewise,	 does	 CBT	 help	 alleviate	 Tom’s	depression	because	it	directly	targets	his	mood	or	because	it	otherwise	induces	changes	 in,	 say,	 the	 low	 serotonin	 levels	 underlying	 his	 depression?	 DMI	explicitly	acknowledges	this	underdetermination.		However,	the	caveat	is	a	significant	loss	in	specificity.	Once	we	adopt	DMI,	manipulability	can	no	longer	be	used	to	directly	infer	causal	relations	(otherwise	we	 would	 face	 an	 inflation	 of	 causal	 claims!);	 DMI	 underdetermines	 the	underlying	dependence	relation.	But,	I	propose,	this	is	a	virtue	rather	than	a	vice:	integrating	 causal	 and	 other	 explanatory	 factors	 into	 a	 single	 model	 is	 a	 key	feature	 of	 network	 explanations	 of	 mental	 disorders	 (e.g.	 Borsboom	 2017;	Borsboom,	Cramer	&	Kalis	 forthcoming).	Of	 course,	we	 still	 need	 some	way	or	other	to	 identify	causes	among	explanatorily	relevant	 factors.	To	achieve	this,	 I	suggest,	we	may	supplement	interventions	with	other	strategies.			
3.2.	Heuristic	Inferences:	Asymmetry	and	Multiple	Experiments	It	 is	 a	platitude	about	 causation	 that	 causes	are	 spatiotemporally	distinct	 from	their	effects	 (e.g.	Lewis	1970);	 causes	precede	 their	effects,	 and	effects	depend	on	their	causes	but	not	vice	versa.	Building	on	this	knowledge,	we	gain	at	 least	two	possible	 criteria	 to	distinguish	causation	 from	other	 forms	of	dependence:	time	and	asymmetry.7	Let	us	first	consider	asymmetry.	
Asymmetric	manipulability	is	a	first	indication	of	but	not	by	itself	sufficient	to	 infer	 causation.	 Take	Gina’s	 case:	 suppose	we	 find	 that	 as	 the	 footsteps	 (I1)	induced	Gina’s	 fear	 (F)	her	heart	 rate	 (H)	 accelerated.	But	we	 can	also	get	her	heart	rate	to	accelerate	if	we	put	her	on	a	treadmill	(I2),	which	does	not	induce	Gina’s	fear.	This	may	lead	us	to	infer	that	F	causes	H	since	we	can	intervene	into	F	with	respect	to	H	but	not	vice	versa.	However,	H	may	also	be	a	supervenience																																																									7	Both	 strategies	 only	work	 so	 long	 as	we	do	not	 commit	 to	 simultaneous	 causation.	 Feedback	loops	can,	however,	be	accommodated	for	in	terms	of	repeated	causal	interactions	between	the	same	factors	at	different	points	in	time	(A	causes	B	at	t1	and	B	causes	A	at	t2,	…)	once	we	take	into	account	temporal	order	and	draw	out	feedback	loops	over	time	(see	section	3.3).	
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base	 or	 realizer	 of	 F	 such	 that	 changes	 in	 F	 are	 necessarily	 accompanied	 by	changes	in	H	while	only	some	changes	in	H	will	be	accompanied	by	changes	in	F	(and	for	the	treadmill	it	was	not).	We	 can	 thus	 derive	 the	 following	 heuristic	 for	 identifying	 causes	across	
multiple	 experiments	 or	 repetitions:	 provided	 that	 repeated	 interventions	 on	 F	with	respect	to	H	do	affect	H,	we	should	consider	F	a	genuine	cause	of	H	when	a	critical	number	of	interventions	(say,	1.000)	into	H	with	respect	to	F	fails.	If,	by	contrast,	some	of	these	interventions	into	H	with	respect	to	F	actually	affect	F,	it	seems	more	plausible	that	F	supervenes	on	/	is	realized	by	H.8			
3.3.	Adding	Dimensions:	Time,	Domain	and	Multiple	Realizers	Let	us	turn	to	time.	Causation	is	typically	considered	diachronic	(see	fn	7)	while	non-causal	 dependence	 relations	 like	 realization,	 implementation,	 constitution,	supervenience,	 part-whole,	 etc.	 are	 usually	 considered	 synchronic	 in	 nature.	Thus,	 the	 temporal	 profile	 of	 variables	 changing	 their	 values	 in	 response	 to	 a	given	intervention	may	give	us	a	clue	as	to	whether	or	not	variables	are	causally	related.	 Notice,	 however,	 that	 inferences	 based	 on	 temporal	 order	 may	 be	compromised	by	practical	and	methodological	constraints.	How	quickly	can	my	measurement	 technique	 detect	 changes?	 What	 are	 adequate	 timescales	 to	consider	 (generations,	 hours,	 nanoseconds,	 …)?	 And	 how	 should	 I	 individuate	variables	to	begin	with?		While	 variable	 individuation	 is	 a	 notorious	 problem	 for	 the	interventionist	(and	constraints	will	likely	depend	on	the	purpose	of	our	analysis	as	well	 as	 the	nature	of	 the	 scenario)	 time	often	 is	 already	 implicit	 in	how	we	draw	causal	graphs:	from	left	to	right,	starting	with	variables	representing	early	occurrences	 of	 properties	 or	 events.	 Yet,	 what	 matters	 for	 interventionists	merely	is	which	variables	are	linked	through	edges,	not	how	they	are	positioned.	By	 adding	 an	 “arrow	 of	 time”	 into	 the	 picture,	 respecting	 the	 order	 in	 which	variables	 take	 their	 values,	 and	 including	 variables	 changing	 their	 values	 over	time	as	multiple	 variables	 (see	 also	Gebharter	 and	Kaiser	2014),	we	 can	make	the	 temporal	dimension	explicit	 (see	 figure	2).	Despite	 the	possible	 increase	 in																																																									8	Analogous	suggestions	are	made	by	Baumgartner	and	Gebharter	(2016)	and	Baumgartner	and	Casini	(forthcoming)	to	identify	mechanistic	constitution.	
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complexity,	 this	 adds	 quite	 some	 representational	 power	 to	 difference-making	graphs	while	 helping	 us	 use	 temporal	 order	 to	 distinguish	 different	 relevance	relations.		In	addition	 to	 temporal	aspects,	scientific	domain	 can	also	give	us	useful	clues	 as	 to	 what	 relations	might	mediate	 observed	manipulability.	The	 idea	 is	perhaps	best	 described	by	 reference	 to	 the	 familiar	 levels-metaphor.	 Variables	representing	 properties	 or	 events	 from	 the	 cognitive	 (mental,	 psychological)	domain	 are	 usually	 regarded	 as	 on	 a	 “higher”	 level	 than,	 say,	 variables	representing	properties	or	events	 from	 the	 “lower”-level	neurophysiological	or	genetic	 domains.	My	 use	 of	 “levels”	 here	 is	 not	 tied	 to	 any	 specific	 account	 of	levels;	 neither	 do	 I	 want	 to	 impose	 any	 specific	 hierarchy	 of	 domains.	 What	matters	for	current	purposes	is	merely	whether	two	variables	are	located	in	the	
same	scientific	domain.9	If	they	are	not,	we	can	draw	on	systematic	knowledge	(or	assumptions	we	may	have)	about	how	variables	 from	 the	domains	 in	question	relate	and	project	that	into	our	graphs.		For	 instance,	 cognitive	 processes	 are	 usually	 considered	 as	neurophysiologically	 implemented	 by	 neural	 processing	 in	 the	 brain.	Accordingly,	 variables	 representing	 mental	 processes,	 e.g.	 memory	 or	depression,	 should	 be	 assumed	 to	 relate	 to	 variables	 representing,	 e.g.,	 low	serotonin	 or	 hippocampal	 long-term	 potentiation	 (LTP)	 by	 implementation	rather	 than	 causation.	 Similarly,	 insights	 about	 specific	 containment	 relations	(this	 AMPA	 receptor	 is	 located	 in	 the	 postsynaptic	membrane	 of	 hippocampal	CA1)	 can	 be	 used	 to	 distinguish	 difference-making	 mediated	 by	 causal	dependencies	 from	difference-making	 due	 to	 part-whole	 relations.	 Graphically,	we	can	represent	such	insights	by	placing	variables	in	our	graphs	along	a	vertical	dimension	and	marking	known	relations	with	specific	kinds	of	arrows	(see	figure	2).		 In	 principle,	 heuristic	 inferences	 based	 on	 time	 and	 domain	 should	 be	considered	 independent,	 neither	 is	 primary.	 Insights	 on	 time	 and	 domain	 are	
																																																								9	For	current	purposes,	I	am	using	the	term	“scientific	domain”	rather	non-technically	to	refer	to	scientific	 fields	 or	 areas	 of	 research	 like	 neuroscience,	 psychology,	 astronomy,	 or	 genetics.	However,	 scientific	 domains	may	 cross-cut	 layers	 of	 a	 traditional	 layer	 cake	 picture	 of	 science	and	how	to	best	individuate	scientific	domains	may	depend	on	the	research	project	at	hand	(see	Kästner	2018).	
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usually	 acquired	 in	 different	 ways:	 Information	 on	 time	 is	 typically	 gathered	through	 intervention-based	 studies.	 Knowledge—or	 assumptions—about	systematic	 relations	 between	 domains	 or	 specific	 containment	 relations,	 by	contrast,	 is	usually	 acquired	 through	meta-scientific	 reasoning	or	 theorizing	as	well	 as	 non-intervention	 studies.	 Non-intervention	 studies	 do	 not	 manipulate	some	factor	X	with	respect	to	another	factor	Y	but	study	features	like	structure	and	 organization	 of	 a	 system	 by	 other	 means	 (see	 Kästner	 2015).	 Examples	include	 staining,	 tracing,	 cutting-open,	 centrifuging,	 and	 x-raying.	 Moreover,	insights	on	time	and	domain	tend	to	play	different	roles	in	our	search	for	causal	relations:	 The	 temporal	 order	 revealed	 by	 interventions	 tends	 to	 suggest	candidate	 causal	 relations.	 Information	 about	 relations	 between	 concrete	variables	or	between	variables	 from	different	domains	typically	restricts	which	manipulability	relations	might	be	considered	candidates	for	causal	relations.	At	times,	the	two	strategies	may	constrain	one	another	or	deliver	conflicting	results.	When	conflicting	results	occur,	we	must	decide	which	one	to	prioritize	based	on	the	reliability	of	the	information	we	fed	into	our	heuristics	to	begin	with.	Finally,	 we	 might	 take	 into	 account	 multiple	 realizers	 to	 acknowledge	that,	 e.g.,	 mental	 disorders	 may	 be	 neurophysiologically	 implemented	 in	different	 ways.	 Depending	 on	 how	 a	 certain	 psychopathology	 is	 realized	 in	 a	patient	it	may	develop	and	be	influenced	in	different	ways.	This	is	important	to	understand,	 say,	 why	 some	 patients	 respond	 well	 to	 certain	 treatments	 and	others	do	not.	Graphically,	we	can	capture	this	 in	different	planes	along	a	third	dimension	 of	 difference-making	 graphs	 where	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 graph	may	differ	between	planes.		Visualizing	 our	 insights	 from	 these	 different	 heuristics	 in	 difference-making	graphs	supplied	with	dimensions	and	multiple	kinds	of	arrows	helps	us	construct	integrative	network	explanations	in	psychiatry	without	loosing	sight	of	actual	 causal	 relations.	 Figure	 2	 illustrates	 what	 this	 may	 look	 like	 for	 Tom’s	case.			
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																			Figure	 2:	 A	 difference-making	 graph	 of	 Tom’s	 case.	 CBT	 (T)	 influences	 Tom’s	grief	(G)	and	possibly	his	depressive	state	(D)	as	well	as	his	serotonin	levels	(S).	Gene	 expression	 as	measured	 using	 biomarkers	 (B’,	 B)	may	 be	 considered	 the	implementation	base	or	realizer	 (dotted	double	arrows)	of	serotonin	 levels	 (S’,	S).	Medication	(M)	targets	serotonin	 levels	but	may	also	have	a	cognitive	effect	(possibly	 a	 placebo-effect)	 on	 D.	 Different	 kinds	 of	 relations	 are	 marked	 with	different	 kinds	 of	 arrows	 and	 variables	 are	 arranged	 along	 three	 dimensions	(time,	 domain,	 realizers).	 The	 grey	 graph	 symbolizes	 the	 inclusion	 of	multiple	realizers	in	different	planes;	causal	relations	may	differ	between	these	planes.		
4.	Conclusions	Causal	 explanations	 in	 psychiatry	 are	 not	 merely	 a	 result	 of	 “sloppy	 talk”;	distinguishing	 between	 causes	 and	 other	 difference-makers	 is	 actually	 highly	relevant	 for	 psychiatry	 as	 a	 scientific	 discipline	 as	well	 as	 for	 clinical	 practice.	However,	multiple	different	 factors	may	contribute	 to	a	given	psychopathology	in	 various	 ways.	 Thus	 restricting	 our	 analysis	 to	 causal	 relations	 only	 is	 too	limited.	DMI	acknowledges	this	by	modifying	the	Woodwardian	interventionism	such	 that	 it	 can	 be	 applied	 in	 contexts	 where	 non-causal	 dependencies	 are	present.	Still,	identifying	causal	relations	among	other	dependencies	remains	an	epistemically	 demanding	 endeavor.	 Employing	 additional	 heuristics	 based	 on	multiple	experiments,	considerations	of	time	and	scientific	domain	may	help	us	identify	genuine	causes	among	difference-makers.			
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